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Economic Regulation in a Plural Public Sector; The Office of Rail and Road and 
Network Rail. 
Tony Prosser 
Professor of Public Law, University of Bristol 
What is the justification for economic regulation of publicly-owned enterprises by an 
independent agency?  The conventional argument is that this is to prevent unfair competition, 
especially where a public enterprise controls essential infrastructure or has a dominant 
position, but this article will argue that there are other justifications which apply even where 
there is limited competition in relevant markets.  The example chosen will be that of the 
regulation of Network Rail, the UK owner and operator of rail infrastructure, by the Office of 
Rail and Road (ORR).  The ORR does indeed have a role in promoting fair competition and 
access to essential infrastructure for enterprises providing rail services, but overall 
competition within the UK rail market is highly restricted.  EU law requires a regulatory body 
to supervise access to infrastructure, but, quite apart from the (uncertain) effects of Brexit, the 
role of the ORR goes far beyond this and, as we shall see, encompasses major tasks not 
shared by its counterparts elsewhere in Europe.  Why then is a regulatory agency needed?  
Could its tasks be better performed directly by government? 
In 2001 I suggested in this journal that there was a place for independent economic regulation 
of state-owned enterprises, in particular to secure a greater degree of transparency compared 
to the highly secretive and incoherent relations between government and nationalised 
industries characteristic of earlier practice in the UK.1  This argument needs revisiting in the 
context of highly complex institutional relationships now characteristic both of government 
and of public enterprises themselves.  A further justification for independent regulatory 
agencies has been that of promoting competition, especially in markets liberalised under EU 
law, notably electronic communications and energy (though most UK regulatory 
developments predate this).  The argument is that the promotion of effective competition 
requires regulatory independence both from market actors and government, especially where, 
 
 I am most grateful to Akis Psygkas, Charlotte Villiers and the anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments. 
1 T. Prosser, ‘Regulating Public Enterprises’ [2001] P.L. 505.  For earlier experience with the nationalised 




as in several Continental European countries, government has retained a substantial stake in 
dominant enterprises.2 
This article will suggest a different justification for independent, ex ante, regulation of public 
enterprises; that of coping with institutional complexity.  As the argument will show, both 
government and public enterprises now involve a high degree of institutional pluralism, and 
some of the most serious problems which have arisen result from a lack of communication 
between the various actors.  This results in a ‘regulatory space’ very different from that of 
bilateral relationships between enterprise and an assumed unitary government.3  Independent 
regulation has two especial advantages in relation to such a multi-actor system.  As we shall 
see, it can provide a means of creating fora for the critical and collaborative exchange of 
information and requirements between the different actors.  Secondly, such regulation can 
provide an independent source of scrutiny both of the information itself and the adequacy of 
the communicative arrangements between the different actors. 
I shall concentrate on one area of rail regulation; that of funding rail infrastructure and the 
role of the ORR in this.  The governing institutions involved include not just the ORR itself 
but the Department for Transport as the relevant department of central government, the 
devolved governments of the different nations of the UK, emerging new institutions at 
regional level, and local government.  The Scottish Government has broad responsibility for 
rail policy and strategy, including both franchising of passenger services and funding 
infrastructure improvements.  The Welsh Government has also had increased responsibilities 
devolved to it, including substantial powers on franchising and also in relation to 
infrastructure on some routes in Wales.  Management of two rail franchises in the North of 
England has been delegated to Rail North, a consortium of local authorities, acting in 
partnership with the Department for Transport, and a similar model has been adopted for the 
West Midlands through the role of the West Midlands Combined Authority.  In addition to 
their role in franchising, it is also intended that regional bodies will have a greater role in 
planning enhancements of the rail network, including funding. 
 
2 See S. Lavrijssen and A. Ottow, ‘Independent Supervisory Authorities: A Fragile Concept’ (2012) 39 Legal 
Issues of European Integration, 419; case C-424/07, Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, [2010] ECR 
I-01885. 
3 For the origins of the influential concept of ‘regulatory space’ see L. Hancher and M. Moran, ‘Organising 
Regulatory Space’ in Hancher and Moran (eds), Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford: 




The delivery of rail services is through a peculiarly complex set of different actors in the UK.  
Network Rail itself (now increasingly internally devolved to regions and routes) owns and 
operates the infrastructure and since 2014 has been in the public sector.  Users in the form of 
private passenger train operating companies and the providers of freight services need to gain 
access to the infrastructure in order to run services, and they pay charges for such access.  
Network Rail also has massive funding from central government in the form of direct grants 
and borrowing.  I shall argue that, within this complicated picture, the role of the regulator 
should be to organise and enhance communication between these various actors and to ‘keep 
them honest’ by providing outside scrutiny, especially ex ante scrutiny, of their operations. 
The future of rail services is a matter of intense public debate in the UK, with the current 
government having announced a major review and the main opposition party pledged to 
renationalisation.  Whatever the outcome, whether it involves altered arrangements for 
private delivery of services or extended public ownership, a complex and pluralistic 
institutional pattern is set to remain.  There is likely to be a growing role for sub-national 
government, devolution has taken place within Network Rail itself, and even if 
renationalisation of the delivery of services takes place, it is not likely to take a highly 
centralised form.4 
The Office of Rail and Road 
The ORR was created as the Office of the Rail Regulator by the Railways Act 1993, and 
initially followed the model of vesting legal powers in a single director assisted by an office.  
However, this structure was replaced under the Railways and Transport Safety Act by a 
regulatory commission similar to that developed for other public utilities.  It is composed of a 
Chairman and Chief Executive, two other executive members and seven non-executive 
directors.  Under the Railways Act 2005 the ORR acquired responsibility for rail safety and 
has more recently also acquired some responsibilities for economic management of the roads 
network; both fall outside the scope of this article.  It is funded entirely by licence fees and a 
levy for its safety work. 
The ORR’s functions are set out in the Railways Act (as heavily amended).5  The major 
functions are to regulate Network Rail’s management of the national rail network, including 
 
4 For suggestions as to the future see e.g. T.Prosser and L.Butler, ‘Rail Franchises, Competition and Public 
Service’ (2018) 81 M.L.R. 23. 




determining its output targets and funding requirements, to licence operators of railway 
assets, and to approve track, station and light maintenance depot access.6  Underlying these 
functions are complex statutory duties applying to the ORR; indeed, given the complexity 
and incoherence of these duties they are clearly due for clarification and reform.7  They 
include duties to promote improvements in railway service performance, to protect the 
interests of rail users, to promote the use of the rail network to the greatest extent that the 
ORR considers reasonably practicable, to contribute to the development of an integrated 
system of transport and to sustainable development, to promote efficiency and economy by 
providers of rail services, to promote competition and to impose the minimum restrictions on 
rail operators consistent with the operation of the ORR’s functions.  Given the complexity 
and the contradictory nature of the duties, the ORR has to develop objectives through its 
business plan and prioritise the use of its resources accordingly.8 
In rail liberalisation elsewhere in the EU, the role of the regulator is to promote competition 
by policing charges to avoid discrimination and securing access by competing operators to 
essential facilities.9  However, the model of rail privatisation adopted in the UK has only a 
very limited role for on-track competition for passenger services through ‘open access’ 
competition.  This represents less than 1% passenger miles, and recent proposals to increase 
its role substantially are unlikely to result in fundamental change.10 Instead, a system of 
franchising was adopted in which the competition is for the award of a franchise giving near-
exclusive rights for the provision of services over particular groups of routes; competition is 
for the franchise, not on the tracks.11  Rail freight by contrast has been liberalised with 
competing operators providing services on the tracks.  The ORR does have competition-
promoting functions in approving access arrangements, for example to stations and 
maintenance depots, and it has powers to enforce competition law in the rail sector 
concurrently with the Competition and Markets Authority.12  Of all the ORR functions, 
 
6 For a useful summary see ORR, ‘Our Functions’ at http://orr.gov.uk/about-orr/what-we-do/our-functions 
(accessed 16 May 2019). 
7 The duties are set out in s. 4 of the Railways Act 1993, as heavily amended. 
8 For the current version see Office of Rail and Road Business Plan 2018-19 at: 
http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/27465/orr-business-plan-2018-19.pdf (accessed 16 May 2019). 
9 See in particular the recast directive; Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, JO L 343/32, 14.12.2012. 
10 Competition and Markets Authority, Competition in Passenger Rail Transport Services in Great Britain: A 
Policy Document (London: Competition and Markets Authority 2016). For the lukewarm response by the 
Government see Department for Transport, Connecting People: A Strategic Vision for Rail, Cm 9519, (2017), 
para. 3.43.  
11 For a detailed discussion see Prosser and Butler, op. cit., n. 4. 




however, the Periodic Review process is of the greatest importance, much more so than the 
promotion of on-track competition for passenger services. This is conducted every five years 
and requires the ORR to determine what Network Rail is to deliver over the next five years 
and how this should be funded;it will be considered in depth in the following section. 
Although the ORR is an independent regulatory agency not subject to direct government 
control of its decisions, it operates in a field inevitably central to government transport policy 
and its decisions may have major implications for public spending.  In 2017-18 the rail 
system received net government support of £6.4 billion, £4 billion of which took the form of 
direct grants to the infrastructure company.  Network Rail had debt of £51.2 billion, which is 
covered by a government guarantee.13  Clearly then, Network Rail efficiency will be 
something which is of central concern to government and to taxpayers.  This is in part 
recognised in the legislative framework; the Act requires the ORR to have regard to general 
guidance given by the Secretary of State.14  It has been regularly reissued, the most recent 
edition being from July 2017, but is brief and highly general, setting out high-level objectives 
such as valuing passengers as customers, reforming the railway, securing value for money 
and fostering investment.15 
A major tension throughout the life of the ORR has been how to maintain independence 
whilst recognising the constraints imposed by this broader framework.  There was an early 
crisis in relations.  Network Rail’s predecessor was the wholly privatised Railtrack, which 
faced financial collapse after neglect of infrastructure investment and maintenance resulting 
in a number of accidents.  Railtrack then approached the government for further funds and for 
the company to be taken out of the regulatory regime for four years; it was also possible that 
the regulator would be prepared to come to the company’s aid by agreeing an interim review 
of charges to ease its finances.  However, the Government proceeded by placing Railtrack 
into administration under the Railways Act, therefore effectively ending its existence.  The 
Rail Regulator was told that, should he initiate an interim review of charges, the government 
would rush through emergency legislation to remove his powers to do so.  This represented 
 
13 ORR, Rail Finance: 2017-18 Annual Statistical Release at: 
http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/39381/rail-finance-statistical-release-2017-18.pdf (accessed 16 
May 2019). 
14 Railways Act 1993, as amended, ss 4(5)(a) and 4(5B). 
15 Department for Transport, Guidance to the Office of Rail and Road (2017) at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/629698/guida




an unprecedented attempt to overrule a regulator in the exercise of its allocated 
responsibilities.16 
A new, much more satisfactory, system was established by the Railways Act 2005.17  Before 
each periodic review of charges the Secretary of State must set out the government’s strategy 
(‘information about what he wants to be achieved by railway activities in Great Britain’) and 
the public resources available to for the railways during the period covered by the periodic 
review.18  They take the form of the ‘high level output specification’ (HLOS) and the 
‘statement of public funds available’ (SOFA); similar statements are issued by the Scottish 
Government.  These statements serve both to create a meaningful context in which the ORR 
can review charges, and to enable it to consider whether funding is sufficient for the outputs 
to be achieved.  The system goes a considerable way towards creating a rational and open 
division of functions between regulator and government, though, as we shall see, the 
approach of government to the provision of detail in the HLOS has not been consistent. 
One further change is of the utmost importance in understanding the role of the ORR in 
relation to Network Rail.  Its predecessor, Railtrack, was a wholly privately-owned company.  
After Railtrack’s demise, Network Rail was created as a statutory corporation in the form of a 
not-for-dividend private company limited by guarantee.  It was composed of over 100 public 
and industry members reflecting stakeholder interests in rail.  Crucially, its borrowings were 
not on the government’s balance sheet; instead it funded investment through massive 
borrowing from the private sector; its debt stood at £31 billion by 2014.  However, from 
September 2014 it was reclassified as a public body due to the interpretation by the Office for 
National Statistics of the European accounting standard ESA10; the effect was that its 
borrowing would be treated in future as government borrowing.  The Secretary of State 
became the sole member of Network Rail, and in future it was to borrow only from the 
Treasury.  Relations between the Department and Network Rail are governed by a 
Framework agreement.19  The most important change was that, whilst previously there was 
no limit to Network Rail borrowing, a hard debt ceiling of £30.3 billion was set to cover 
expenditure required in the next five year regulatory control period.  Freedom to move money 
 
16 For the then regulator’s account of events see T. Winsor, ‘The Future of the Railways: Sir Robert Reid 
Memorial Lecture 2004’ (2003/04) 13 Utilities Law Review, 145. 
17 Department for Transport, The Future of Rail, Cm 6233 (2004); Railways Act 1993 as amended, sch. 4, paras 
1-1H.  
18 Railways Act 1993, as amended, sch. 4A, para. 1D. 




between years and between capital and operational expenditure was also restricted.  The 
effect was seriously to limit future flexibility of investment funding and to make the oversight 
of its affordability much more important.20  Network Rail is thus a wholly public enterprise, a 
point often missed in criticism of the ‘privatised’ UK rail network. 
The Periodic Review Process 
At first sight the Periodic Review may appear to be little different from the regular reviews 
by other regulatory agencies of the charges of monopoly network industries, thus setting the 
access costs for other companies which provide services using the infrastructure, and 
effectively determining a substantial proportion of prices to consumers.21  In practice, 
however, the rail Periodic Review is a process of extraordinary depth and detail.22  It takes 
the form of a five-yearly review of the access charges which Network Rail can levy on users 
(including train operating companies); the review also determines the outputs which the 
enterprise is to deliver, and effectively determines how the framework of public funding 
described above can be used most efficiently.  The Review is forward-looking; it sets the 
outputs and funding for a five-year Control Period commencing after the review has been 
completed.  It differs from other regulatory reviews in that so much of the funding of the rail 
network comes from public funds, and it thus involves in-depth scrutiny of the enterprise’s 
efficiency and goes far beyond the competition-based functions of rail regulators elsewhere in 
Europe designed to prevent discriminatory charges being levied. 
The first Periodic Review in 2000 was highly critical of the financial regime adopted after 
privatisation, but it was rapidly overtaken by the collapse of Railtrack and the related 
problems around the role of government mentioned above.  The 2008 Review was undertaken 
under the new regime in the Railways Act 2005 clarifying the role of government, and seems 
to have been broadly successful, though there was some criticism that it had been a relatively 
closed process involving the Department for Transport producing a plan handed over as a 
finished product and that there had been limited accountability to the broader public and to 
other stakeholders.23 
 
20 For details see Department for Transport, Report of the Bowe Review into the planning of Network Rail’s 
Enhancements Programme 2014-2019, Cm 9147 (2015), paras 4.20-22, 4.38. 
21 For an introduction to the issues of network regulation, see R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, 
Understanding Regulation: Theory Strategy and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2012), 443-
502. 
22 The legislative basis is the Railways Act 1993, s. 4 and sch. 4A, both as amended. 
23 ‘Investing in the Railway’, HC 257, 2014-1, para. 12; ORR, Independent PR08 Programme Evaluation, esp. 





The depth and complexity of the process was evident in PR13, which examined funding for 
Control Period 5 from 2014-19 (CP5).  The Review was undertaken in three stages from May 
2011 to April 2014, and involved the issue of no less than 27 different consultations and in 
total 58 related publications.24  The full determination ran to 959 pages.  PR13 coincided with 
a major programme of government investment in the rail industry through ‘enhancements’; 
investment in improving the network such as new electrification in addition to maintenance 
and renewal of existing infrastructure.  As a basis for this, a HLOS was produced listing a 
large number of projects to be funded, and also setting out the aim that the rail industry 
should reduce its costs by £3.5 billion by 2019.  The document also contained the SOFA 
broken down by year; the total government funds available for the five-year period were to be 
over £18 billion, with a further £3 billion provided by the Scottish Government.25  PR 13 
concluded that there was an overall expenditure requirement for CP5 of £38.3bn, of which 
£12.8bn represented enhancements.26 
Given the huge sums involved, the complexity of the process might seem justified, and the 
process of PR13 itself was greeted by a ‘broadly positive’ response.27  However, there were 
serious problems in implementation of investment decisions during CP5.  For renewals of the 
infrastructure, there was a decline in efficiency; by June 2015 renewals were costing 19% 
more than expected.  This resulted in around £3.7bn of work being deferred against a forecast 
spend of around £14bn.28  The major problems occurred in relation to enhancements.  The 
commitment by government to several key projects had occurred at too early a stage to 
permit costings when the funding package was agreed by the ORR.  This was dealt with by 
the ‘enhancements cost adjustment mechanism’ involving ORR scrutiny of the final costs as 
they became available, benchmarking them against a baseline efficient cost.  In practice there 
was no relationship between this and the actual costs incurred by Network Rail, and the result 
was massive cost overruns; notably, costs of the Great Western electrification programme 
 
24 The details can be found in the documents collected under Periodic Review 2013 on the ORR website at: 
http://orr.gov.uk/rail/economic-regulation/regulation-of-network-rail/price-controls/periodic-review-2013 
(accessed 16 May 2019).  A good account of the background is Transport Committee, ‘Investing in the 
Railway’, n. 23 above, ch. 3. 
25 Department for Transport, Railways Act 2005 Statement (2012). 
26 ORR, Periodic Review 2013: Final determination of Network Rail’s outputs and funding for 2014-19, (2013), 
Table 2, p. 25.  This is the gross expenditure requirement, not limited to direct public funding but including 
funding through access charges and other sources, so is considerably higher than the amount in the SOFA. 
27 ‘Investing in the Railway’, n. 23 above, para. 13. 
28 ORR, Making the Railway More Efficient, 5 September 2017 at: http://orr.gov.uk/news-and-media/orr-




rose by £2.1bn, and there were also major delays and reductions in scope.29  As regards 
enhancements, the process of regulatory scrutiny thus appeared to have failed.  What were the 
reasons for this?  They can be located not in the Periodic Review itself but in the problems of 
dysfunctional institutional relations during the process. 
This became evident from a plethora of reviews of a wide range of aspects of rail investment 
planning and delivery; one question which arose as a result was whether it was appropriate to 
have independent regulation of public sector bodies.  The Bowe review of the planning of the 
2014-2019 enhancement programme concluded that a major problem had been the unclear 
definition of different organisational responsibilities between the Department, Network Rail 
and the ORR.  As a result, management of relations between the organisations had been 
characterised by ‘unhelpful informality, with unclear assumptions and a working culture that 
tried to solve project problems in a localised and on an ad hoc basis without regard to 
implications across the rail portfolio.’30  On this point, the Bowe Review concluded that the 
reclassification of Network Rail ‘fundamentally increases the oversight required in assuring 
the affordability of rail infrastructure investment.  At CP5 the ORR’s role, in hindsight, was 
unclear; and, given reclassification, I conclude that the role of the regulator for future 
enhancement planning needs to be rethought.’31  Despite the opening up to stakeholders of 
the PR13 process, the report found that there had been only limited involvement of users in 
the planning and implementation of how enhancements should be delivered; ‘I have been 
struck, as I have considered all the evidence provided to the Review, by the lack of any clear 
view about who is responsible for articulating the specific interests of users of the rail system 
and in particular passengers.’32 
The question of whether independent regulation of Network Rail was still required was also 
considered in depth in another review, the Shaw Report on the future shape and funding of 
Network Rail.  It strongly supported the continuation of independent regulation, including 
retention of the Periodic Review process.  Independence was required to give the regulator 
authority, and, although there was a number of areas where tension would arise between the 
regulator and government, there was still a need for ‘healthy, challenging, and constructive 
dialogue between Network Rail, the ORR and the DfT. … Transparency of communication 
and publication will be an important factor in preventing any possibility that the ORR is 
 
29 For detailed analysis see National Audit Office, ‘Modernising the Great Western Railway’, HC 781, 2016-17. 
30 Report of the Bowe Review, n. 20 above, para. 4.34; see also paras 1.4, 1.7-8,4.3, 4.10 and 4.30-4.38. 
31 Ibid, para. 4.38. 




viewed as lacking in independence.’33  The role of the regulator was to be shaped by two 
further key groups of recommendations.   The first was that, as emphasised in other reports, it 
was necessary to clarify the role of government, which must produce a long-term strategic 
vision for the railways, based on the views of all the stakeholders, setting clear, deliverable 
priorities for the next 30 years and a long-term context for political decisions.34  There should 
also be greater involvement of stakeholders in planning future enhancements and their 
delivery.  Secondly, and key to the report, was the recommendation that Network Rail 
operations should be internally devolved; it should be split into a central systems operator and 
regional routes.  Not only would this bring the business’s operation closer to rail users, it 
would also permit route-based comparative regulation, thereby reducing the problems caused 
by the limited role for direct financial sanctions in relation to public enterprises.35  This major 
emphasis on devolution ties in, as noted above, with a similar stress on devolution of 
government responsibilities, with an increased role in rail franchising for the Welsh 
Government and for emerging regional authorities in, for example, the North and the West 
Midlands.  The Government accepted the recommendations of the Shaw report, and a final 
internal review by the Department for Transport also found strong support for continued 
independent regulation of Network Rail and decided that it should be retained, though 
enhancements could be outside the Periodic Review process.36 
To summarise lessons to be drawn from this process, at first sight it might seem to be a 
classic example of regulatory failure.  The process was long, demanding and expensive, and 
did not in the end provide a realistic assessment of the costs and feasibility of the ambitious 
enhancements programme.  The ORR was criticised for inadequate scrutiny of the plans and 
of Network Rail’s capacity to implement them at efficient cost.37  However, an independent 
evaluation found that consultation during the Review process itself had broadly worked well 
and had made a clear difference to the outcome; it recommended changes to reduce the 
burdens of the consultation process through adopting a more collaborative and informal 
approach.38   It is in the planning and implementation of how enhancements were to take 
 
33 Department for Transport, The Shaw Report: The future shape and financing of Network Rail; the 
recommendations (2016), para. R2.78.   
34 Ibid, para. 1.73. 
35 Ibid, ch. R2. 
36 The actual review is not published, but see Department for Transport, Rail Regulation: Summary of Call for 
Evidence Responses, (2016). 
37 Committee of Public Accounts, ‘Network Rail’s 2014-2019 Investment Programme’, HC 473, 2015-16, 
Conclusion 2. 
38 P. Boys, An Independent Study Into the Office of Rail Regulation’s Consultation With Stakeholders During 




place after the Review that the limited user involvement identified in the Bowe report was a 
serious problem.39  This suggests that the major failures were on the part of the Government 
and of Network Rail, not in the conduct of PR13.40  In particular, the former had produced a 
‘wish list’ in its HLOS with inadequate costings and had failed to produce anything 
resembling a long-term vision for the railways within which the development and 
enhancement of the system could be properly planned.  Moreover, Network Rail had 
inadequate planning and cost control processes and was unresponsive to users; this was made 
worse by the structural complexity of the fragmented rail industry. Institutional relationships 
were incoherent and unclear, which had resulted in communication through unstructured 
personal relationships which did not look at projects in the round, a problem which had 
characterised earlier relations between government and nationalised industries.41 
PR18 
PR18 covers Control Period 6 (CP6) from 2019-2024; it commenced in May 2016 and a final 
determination was issued on in October 2018.42  It determined an overall expenditure 
requirement  of £50bn for England and Wales (including £10.4bn for enhancements, though 
these were not assessed in the Review) and £5bn for Scotland, and a revenue requirement for 
funding under the Review of £36bn, as compared with £27bn for CP5.43  There were major 
differences from the process used for PR13.  The first was that the HLOS for England was a 
very different document than that for the previous Review.  In view of the problems which 
had arisen then one would have expected enhancements to have been spelled out in greater 
detail with more attention given to costs; in fact, enhancements were excluded from the 
HLOS, which instead covers only operations maintenance and renewal, safety, performance 
and reliability, and demand and capacity.  All these were dealt with in two pages of a short 
document strikingly lacking in detail.44  By contrast, the HLOS issued by the Scottish 
Government was a much more substantial document with thirteen pages of detail.45  The 
 
39 Report of the Bowe Review, n. 20 above, paras 5.14-5.15 
40 See Committee of Public Accounts, ‘Modernising the Great Western Railway’, HC 776, 2016-17. 
41 See Prosser, Nationalised Industries and Public Control, n. 1 above, chs 2-3. 
42 ORR, 2018 Periodic Review Final Determination: Overview of Approach and Decisions and a number of 
other documents collected under Periodic Review 2018 on the ORR website at: http://orr.gov.uk/rail/economic-
regulation/regulation-of-network-rail/price-controls/periodic-review-2018 (accessed 16 May 2019). Apart from 
the documents published by the ORR itself, there is a good account of the process in the Transport Committee, 
‘Rail Infrastructure Investment’, HC 582, 2017-19. 
43 2018 Periodic Review Final Determination, n. 48 above, tables 8.1, 8.2.  Given the major changes between 
PR13 and PR18, total figures are not directly comparable. 
44 Department for Transport, ‘Railways Act 2005 Statement: High Level Output Specification’, HC 296, 2017; 
Department for Transport, ‘Railways Act 2005 Statement: Statement of Funds Available’, HC 448, 2017. 




specification for England and Wales was hardly an effective response to various reports 
arguing that a clearer statement of the government’s vision and policies for the railways was 
a pre-requisite for improved regulation and performance of the industry. 
Even after the exclusion of enhancements, the public funding was very substantial, with 
public funds of £34.7bn made available in the SOFA in the form of Network Grant. In 
developing new arrangements for monitoring this expenditure, PR18 emphasised much more 
strongly than previously the need to engage effectively with the various stakeholders 
involved; these included the train operating companies and freight operators, but also funders, 
passenger representative groups, local authorities and local enterprise partnerships.  As part 
of the Review, the ORR had consulted on stakeholder engagement in drawing up the 
Network Rail Strategic Business Plan and identified areas for improvement; it has set out its 
plans for continuing to monitor and assess the quality of stakeholder engagement throughout 
CP6.46  Such monitoring of Network Rail will be facilitated by the devolution of its functions 
to route level with a relatively small central System Operator responsible for functions such 
as timetabling.  Routes will have major devolved functions, for example in procuring goods 
and services, and funding and expenditure will be recorded at route level.  This will permit 
comparative regulation and benchmarking in which the regulator will monitor and report 
publicly on how well each route is performing against its targets.47 
Through regulation on a route basis, the ORR was then able to identify arrangements for 
improved scrutiny of performance and for the creation of fora for communicative debate 
about the findings.  The use of scorecards at route level setting out key performance metrics 
will be central to the monitoring process. The scorecards ‘capture what each route plans to 
deliver to customers and funders, providing a balanced picture across different aspects of 
delivery, including on safety, asset condition and train performance.  Ideally, they should 
reflect agreement with each customer on a number of key measures, so that scorecards reflect 
what is particularly important to them.’48  The scorecards are developed collaboratively with 
users and agreed with funders; they will be reviewed annually and performance against them 
published quarterly.  Monitoring will be undertaken through the fora of Railway Boards to 
 
46 2018 Periodic Review Final Determination, n. 42 above, 31, 48-53; ORR, How the Office of Rail and Road 
Will Facilitate Improvements in the Quality of Network Rail’s Stakeholder Engagement in CP6 (2019). 
47 2018 Periodic Review Final Determination, n. 42 above, 38-31; ORR, Holding Network Rail to Account 
(2019). 





hold routes to account.  These are new bodies ‘to provide an opportunity for collaboration 
between routes/SO and operators, while also acting as a forum to identify issues and seek 
resolution.’49  In the consultation there had been extensive criticism of existing supervisory 
arrangements, and as a result major changes were made.  The Boards will be chaired by an 
independent member and will be made up of representatives from the route, operators, the 
system operator, the passenger representative body and local and national funders.  They are 
to issue a public report after each meeting and produce a published annual plan.  The Boards 
themselves will be monitored annually by the ORR to ensure that they continue to engage 
effectively with the routes and with stakeholders.  In addition, the ORR itself will organise 
hearings between routes and affected parties.50  The ORR will also itself employ a wider 
range of reputational sanctions give the limited effect of financial sanctions on a non-profit 
oriented body.  Its approach will include the escalation of responses where performance is 
inadequate, representing a rare regulatory acknowledgment of the ‘responsive regulation’ 
literature.51 
As the HLOS suggested, enhancements were taken out of the Periodic Review, and  they 
were made subject to a separate process involving a ‘Rail Network Enhancement Pipeline’ 
involving staged decisions, with each project passing a stage only when it was clear that it 
had passed a number of tests, for example that there was a robust business case and that the 
enhancement would meet the needs of users and would achieve good value for taxpayers.52  
Reflecting greater pluralism in rail governance, more enhancements were to be promoted by 
bodies other than central government, for example local authorities, Metropolitan Mayors and 
the private sector.  This is intended to include financing, and the Scottish Government already 
funds a substantial programme of rail enhancement. This new approach has the advantage 
that it separates out enhancements, which may take many years to plan and implement, from 
the 5-year timescale of the Periodic Reviews, though it is fair to say that this timing was not a 
major reason for the problems encountered in PR13.  However, it also limits opportunities for 
outside ex ante scrutiny of the processes within the Department by appearing seriously to 
restrict the role of the ORR.  The framework agreement between the Department and 
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Network Rail was now supplemented by a memorandum of understanding on enhancements, 
which treats the process as a bi-lateral one between the Department and the business.53  This 
apparent reduction in outside scrutiny was criticised by the Transport Committee of the 
House of Commons as weakening the role of the ORR.54  The Committee was not convinced 
that the Department had taken the necessary steps to ensure that it had the capacity and 
capability to undertake its new role, including determining cost efficiency and value for 
money, and in its response the ORR emphasised its role in monitoring and reporting on the 
delivery of enhancements, rather than offering the ex ante scrutiny offered by the Periodic 
Review.  The limitations of this role were confirmed in a later statement where it was made 
clear that, in England and Wales, the ORR’s role is ‘[n]ot to monitor the cost efficiency of 
enhancement projects or take action in relation to specific milestones, which will not be 
regulated outputs’.55  
Conclusions on the Periodic Review Process 
The complexity of the process raises the question of whether the tasks outlined here are 
appropriate for regulatory involvement at all, and this applies particularly to major 
investment projects, including, though not limited to, enhancements.  There are two other 
alternatives.  The first is to leave the market to determine the allocation of funding.  This 
could reflect possible limitations on the ability of regulators to gain information and their lack 
of expertise in major infrastructure issues.  However, market solutions are not available given 
that Network Rail now borrows from the Treasury, not from the financial markets.  Even 
when it did borrow privately, that appears to have imposed minimal discipline on its finances 
and its ability to fund investment.  Nor, given the natural monopoly elements characteristic of 
rail infrastructure, is it responsive through markets to its users.  In other network industries 
with natural monopoly characteristics it has proved necessary to set prices through regulatory 
review, and this is reinforced by the huge amounts of public money involved in rail. 
The second alternative is to replace the Periodic Review process with a bi-lateral contractual 
relationship with the Department as sponsor; this the new position for enhancements.  Recent 
omens are not good for this approach.  One example is that of the construction of Crossrail, 
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the new trans-London line for which costs were forecast to be £14.8 billion.  The 
infrastructure was not developed by Network Rail and did not fall within the Periodic Review 
process.  It was instead jointly sponsored by Transport for London and the Department for 
Transport, and funds were determined through the government Spending Review process.  
The line was due to have opened in December 2018, but as late as August 2018 is was 
revealed that there would be substantial delays and an increase in costs of between £1.6 and 
£2 billion.56  Relations between the sponsors and the Crossrail Board took place through a 
Sponsor Board, but a review by KPMG found that a basic problem was lack of 
communication between Board and sponsors; there was no proper sharing of information and 
an inadequate use of independent advice.57  The 2018 Periodic Review and its 
recommendations were designed precisely to avoid these problems.  I shall return to the 
effectiveness of bilateral contractual relationships in considering comparative experience 
below.  Given the absence of acceptable alternatives, the question is not whether there should 
be regulatory involvement, but how it should be done; this was indeed the conclusion on 
regulation of all three of the reviews after PR13 discussed above. 
Turning to PR18 itself, there were major improvements made to reflect the pluralism of rail 
governance and to avoid the problems experienced in its predecessors.   Key to these 
improvements was the recognition of the importance of a variety of different actors within 
regulatory space; these include train operating companies and freight operators and also 
passengers and funders.  The new emphasis on benchmarking as a means of comparative 
regulation is linked to new institutional fora involve a wider range of actors in monitoring.  
These will themselves be monitored by the ORR, thus constituting a form of meta-regulation 
in which the regulator oversees the management of processes organised by the enterprise 
itself.58  Such approaches to regulatory process are much more appropriate for the regulation 
of a multi-actor regulatory space than the more conventional techniques adopted in earlier 
Periodic Reviews.  It is also striking that they are being adopted by the independent 
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regulatory agency rather than by the Department, suggesting that an agency will have more 
space to experiment with new techniques than will a government department.   
Turning to enhancements (though these now represent a relatively small proportion of total 
funding), the operation of the new system will be dependent on the development of effective 
procedures for scrutiny within the Department itself, whilst raising the danger that this 
process will be less transparent than one involving an outside regulator.  The Department has 
committed itself to transparency through the publication of public statements as projects pass 
each stage of the enhancements pipeline, but this is clearly subject to far less stakeholder 
involvement and regulatory scrutiny than is the case for the Periodic Review process.59   
For the Periodic Review to work effectively and for proper organisation of enhancements, 
government must adopt a clear long-term vision of how it wishes the rail network to develop; 
this was a key recommendation of the Bowe and Shaw reports, but little has been done to 
achieve it. As discussed above, the HLOS is actually much vaguer than its predecessor.  The 
Department did issue a White Paper on the future of the railways in late 2017, but it is based 
on a model of integration between Network Rail routes and train operating companies 
through the development of partnerships, the detailed plans for which are vague and which 
are likely to face major problems in practice.60 It has already been overtaken by the 
Government’s setting up of a ‘root and branch’ review of rail in September 2018 after the 
collapse of the timetabling process in two regions, intended to report by the end of 2019.61  
By contrast to the UK Government, the Scottish Government has a much more developed and 
articulated strategy for the development of its rail industry, as evidenced by the much fuller 
HLOS. 
Comparative European Experience  
It will be useful to examine experience elsewhere in Europe in the context of the (relatively 
limited) moves towards liberalisation of rail markets.  EU law requires independence of 
undertakings managing railway infrastructure; decisions on essential access to infrastructure 
and charging must be the responsibility of bodies or firms not themselves providing services, 
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and access to infrastructure must be granted on a non-discriminatory basis.62    Member States 
must also establish a licensing authority for railway undertakings, and an independent 
regulatory body to hear appeals and undertake some monitoring functions.63  The powers of 
the regulatory bodies are quite far reaching but are essentially concerned with competition 
issues, in particular the provision of non-discriminatory access to the Network.  The 
infrastructure manager may be funded by the state and must adopt a business plan and 
balance its books over a five-year period.  EU law does not specify the form of state funding 
for infrastructure; this may be provided through access charges paid by providers of rail 
services but funding may be supplemented by direct government grants.  Indeed, there are 
major variations in the ways in which different European Member States have chosen to 
provide support for infrastructure.64  The work of the ORR discussed in this article goes far 
beyond the requirements for independent regulation in EU law. 
The most interesting example from Continental Europe for comparative purposes is that of 
France, where the future organisation and regulation of the rail network has been highly 
controversial, and a law was passed in 2018 to establish a ‘new railway pact’.65  Here the 
regulatory body is the Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires et Routières 
(ARAFER).  It is predominantly concerned with access rights and the avoidance of 
discriminatory access conditions, reflecting the requirements of EU law and not going 
substantially beyond them.66   
Infrastructure support is determined through bilateral contractual relations with the state, 
since 2014 in the form of a contract between the government and SNCF Réseau, the 
infrastructure operator.67  Investment in SNCF Reseau is subject to control through normal 
governmental processes, including the use of a government commissioner, but this has not 
worked well.68  ARAFER does have some powers in this context; it must deliver a non-
binding opinion on the draft contract, it and produces annual reports on implementation.  A 
multi-year performance contract was signed in April 2017, but the first report on it from 
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ARAFER, issued in May 2018, was already highly critical, finding that the contract had not 
created adequate targets or incentives for the infrastructure operator and there had been no 
sanctions for failure to meet objectives set.  ARAFER recommended urgent revision of the 
contract to provide a clearer statement of strategic objectives and priorities for the rail 
network by the government.  This should be accompanied by an in-depth analysis involving 
outside scrutiny of the performance of the infrastructure operator, precisely what the Periodic 
Reviews offer in the UK.69  A similar conclusion was reached in the Spinetta report, 
commissioned by the French Prime Minister to consider the future of the rail industry, which 
provided the basis for the 2018 reforms.  This Report recommended that ARAFER be given 
functions much closer to those of the ORR with extended responsibilities for assessing the 
efficiency of SNCF Réseau.  The role of ARAFER should be reinforced in relation to the 
economic governance of the infrastructure operator by giving it responsibility, within the 
framework provided by the contract between the government and the operator, for assessing 
the costs of the network and determining reasonable productivity targets to be used in 
assessing its efficiency.  This was in order to move beyond the current position in which 
SNCF Réseau was able to build up unlimited debt and was not subject to any financial 
discipline.70  Investment is of course also subject to scrutiny by the state accounting body, the 
Cour des Comptes, but this is usually ex post facto and so resembles the work of the National 
Audit Office in the UK rather than that of the ORR. The importance of this example is to 
show that, in France, a bilateral contractual approach to investment in the rail network 
appears not to have been successful in placing effective disciplines on the infrastructure 
operator, and it has been a far less transparent and open process than that of the Periodic 
Reviews in the UK; the lessons are similar to those which were drawn from the discussion of 
Crossrail above. 
The experience in Continental Europe (and this is not limited to France) is that regulatory 
agencies have an important role in scrutinising charges of rail infrastructure providers on 
competition grounds, but do not have a role in examining value for money in state 
investment.  Instead this is determined on a bilateral, contractual basis; the aim of 
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contractualisation is to provide the sort of long-term security offered in the UK by the 
Periodic Reviews.  However, bilateral contracting is in several ways inferior to ORR’s 
approach.  It is a much more closed process, and it limits the involvement of parties other 
than central government; there is also clear evidence in France, both from the regulatory body 
and the major recent review of rail transport, of difficulties in securing clear objectives, 
proper efficiency incentives for the infrastructure operator, and proper scrutiny of the 
operator’s performance. 
Conclusion 
Economic regulation of public enterprises has normally been seen as a means of promoting 
competition where the enterprise controls access to infrastructure or is dominant.  This 
creates a strong case for independent regulation of the rail infrastructure operator, as is the 
case in other network industries, but fact the process is complicated in the UK both by the rail 
industry’s heavy reliance on public funds rather than charges to other enterprises and 
consumers and by the role of other actors including public funders and users of the 
infrastructure.  Independent regulation is not just to facilitate the competitive provision of 
services, but it performs a role of scrutiny ex ante in order to examine the feasibility of plans 
for investment when they are being developed and to assess the best means of achieving 
value for money.  This supplements scrutiny by institutions such as the National Audit Office 
which is ex post facto and inevitably sporadic. 
UK experience suggests that the public sector should be seen as an inter-connected network 
of different institutions at different levels.  It is important to stress that this is not a reason for 
retaining the current fragmented structure of the UK rail industry, which it is now agreed has 
given rise to major, and unacceptable, problems.71  Indeed, the approach taken in PR18 
stressing the importance of collaboration between different actors could be seen as an attempt 
(perhaps doomed) to prop up a failed fragmented rail system.  However, it has much greater 
potential than this.  At present it is unclear what the future structure of rail will be; but even 
should there be renationalisation, this is not likely to take the form of a single monolithic 
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public enterprise, which is anyway a mis-reading of the position pre-privatisation when the 
nationalised British Rail was never an institutional monolith.72 
Any move to re-nationalisation will have to take account of the growing regionalisation of 
both of governmental structures and of rail operation within the UK.  Such regionalisation 
has for some time been a characteristic of rail systems in Continental Europe; the UK has 
previously been an exception, but this is now changing.  Indeed, some influential proponents 
of re-nationalisation have emphasised this.73  It is also striking that central government in the 
UK has failed to develop a clear strategy for rail, despite this being a major recommendation 
of different reviews, as outlined above.  If neither top-down nor market forms of organisation 
work, this leaves room for a greater involvement of sub-national and user groups to fill the 
gaps.  Indeed, the Scottish Government is already leading the way both in the franchising of 
passenger services and in enhancements. 
If the government side is becoming more pluralistic, the same is true of the management and 
delivery of projects.  Quite apart from any potential role for the private sector, a major reform 
is that of the devolution of Network Rail to regional routes with an increased degree of 
autonomy to meet user needs.  Indeed, this reflects similar internal devolution to regions and 
business sectors under British Rail; it is in no way incompatible with re-nationalisation.  A 
great advantage of this institutional arrangement is that it permits benchmarking and 
comparative regulation, thereby making the regulatory task easier, reducing information 
asymmetry and permitting publicity to be used as a potential sanction.  It also permits the 
closer involvement of users in the form of passenger and freight operators. 
The danger of a more pluralistic system of governance is that of incoherence and lack of 
coordination.  It is precisely this that makes the continuation of independent regulation 
necessary.  This is quite distinct from its importance in promoting competition, should that be 
adopted as major goal in relation to rail.  However, to be effective in this context, regulation 
needs to be of a particular kind.  In order to avoid systemic incoherence it needs to facilitate 
communication between the different parties involved and to provide scrutiny to ‘keep them 
honest’ by testing claims and performance and providing a means of learning from them.74  
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What was clear from the experience with PR13, especially in relation to enhancements, was 
that regulation cannot be effective without proper input from all the parties involved which is 
then subject to searching scrutiny by others.  This was shown by the lack of effective 
information from government on the ambitious enhancement plans and their costings and the 
inadequate project planning and implementation by Network Rail.  The removal of 
enhancements from the Periodic Review process for the future could well be a retrograde step 
through reducing opportunities for independent scrutiny.  In other respects, the process for 
PR18 was a major improvement through greater encouragement of user involvement and use 
of benchmarking and a range of escalating sanctions. 
What will be most important will be a form of regulatory governance that is not simply a 
matter of informal closed negotiation and bargaining but which maintains structures and 
processes for collaboration.75  In doing so it should be possible for the regulator to play an 
important role in building trust through forcing an opening out of the debate and a testing of 
arguments, even where the regulator does not have the final word.  This is likely to be 
feasible in this context as economic regulation of rail infrastructure is essentially concerned 
with the deployment of resources and value for money.  It does not involve the consideration 
of a wider range of social values which may raise incommensurable principles to be 
balanced; universal service is dealt with separately through the franchising system.  All the 
actors are likely to speak the same language, thereby reducing the need for regulatory 
translation, which Black has characterised as a major problem for communicative 
regulation.76 
In the UK, nationalisation and delivery of services by public enterprises is back on the 
political agenda after an absence of many years.  Alongside this is a growing pluralisation of 
the public sector.  The effect is to make a developed role for independent regulation more 
rather than less important.  Rail might be seen as different from other means of delivering 
public services given its peculiarly fragmented institutional structure in the UK; however, the 
argument may also be relevant to other public services which have complex institutional 
structures and where communication between different institutions is necessary even within 
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the public sector.  Market liberalisation and competition are not the only ways of making 
public services more responsive to users; the role of regulation will be to facilitate forms of 
devolution of such services which combine responsiveness with overall coherence and 
opportunities for scrutiny. 
 
